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The U.S. Supreme Court decision to uphold most 
of the Affordable Care Act (ACA), including the 
insurance-coverage requirement, allows historic 
reforms in the health care system to move for-
ward.1,2 Because the justices were split four to 
four on whether the ACA was constitutional, 
Chief Justice John Roberts was able to write the 
lead opinion that commanded five votes for what-
ever outcome he determined was constitutional. 
The chief justice’s leadership in upholding almost 
all of the ACA was unanticipated, as was much 
of his legal reasoning. It was widely assumed 
that the interpretation of the Commerce Clause 
by the Court would determine whether the Con-
stitution authorized Congress to require indi-
viduals to purchase a product from private com-
panies, something Congress had never done 
before and, therefore, something the Court had 
never considered.3,4 It was not surprising that 
the chief justice found no Commerce Clause au-
thority for the individual mandate. The surprise 
was that he saved the individual mandate by de-
termining that it was a constitutional tax. The 
chief justice received support for each of these 
conclusions from two different four-justice groups, 
sometimes referred to as the liberal and conser-
vative wings of the Court. Perhaps most unex-
pected, seven justices voted to limit the power of 
the federal government to impose conditions on 
federal funding allocated to the states.
Direct Federal Regulation under  
the Commerce Clause
The chief justice began his opinion by describing 
our federal system, underlining that the federal 
government possesses only limited powers — 
those listed or enumerated in the Constitution. 
Powers not granted to the federal government in 
the Constitution are retained by the states. In this 
case, the question was whether either the federal 
power to regulate commerce or the power to tax 
authorized specific provisions of the ACA.
The Commerce Clause has historically been 
interpreted as granting the federal government 
broad power to regulate matters of interstate 
commerce and activities that affect such com-
merce.5 Examples include the regulation of drugs,6 
consumer products,7 air and water pollution,8 
workplace safety,9 and discrimination in employ-
ment.10 Nonetheless, the chief justice conclud-
ed that the Commerce Clause did not include the 
power to impose a mandate on individuals to buy 
health insurance from a private company. Jus-
tices Antonin Scalia, Anthony Kennedy, Clarence 
Thomas, and Samuel Alito, in a jointly written 
dissent, agreed with the chief justice regarding 
the limitations of the Commerce Clause.
In the majority view on this issue, the power 
of the federal government to require or regulate 
behavior applies only to people who are actively 
engaged in commerce. As the chief justice put 
it, “The Framers gave Congress the power to regu-
late commerce, not to compel it. . . .”1 (italics in 
original). These justices accepted the argument 
that individuals who are not currently seeking care 
or under the care of physicians or other health 
professionals “are not currently engaged in any 
commercial activity involving health care.” They 
rejected the argument by the government that 
the fact that virtually everyone is or will at some 
point be in the health care market empowers 
Congress to regulate how they pay for their care. 
Instead, the chief justice distinguished the health 
insurance market from the health care market, 
concluding that they “involve different transac-
tions, entered into at different times, with dif-
ferent providers.”1 He concluded, “The individual 
mandate forces individuals into commerce pre-
cisely because they elected to refrain from com-
mercial activity. Such a law cannot be sustained 
under a clause authorizing Congress to ‘regulate 
Commerce.’ ”1
The decisive issue for these five justices was 
their view of federalism, specifically how to dis-
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tinguish federal authority to regulate commerce 
from the inherent authority of the state (“police 
power”) to directly regulate individuals, such as 
by requiring immunizations and school atten-
dance. If the Commerce Clause allowed the fed-
eral government to regulate people who are not 
engaged in commerce, they worried, then the 
federal government would have the same power 
that states have to regulate individual behavior, 
because almost anything that anyone does or 
does not do can affect the national economy. 
Congress can regulate a great deal of what peo-
ple do, but these five justices drew the line at 
inactivity, lest the Commerce Clause “give Con-
gress the same license to regulate what we do 
not do, fundamentally changing the relation be-
tween the citizen and the Federal Govern-
ment. . . . That is not the country the Framers 
of our Constitution envisioned.”1 In the chief 
justice’s words, “Every day individuals do not do 
an infinite number of things. . . . Any police 
power to regulate individuals as such, as op-
posed to their activities, remains vested in the 
states.”1
Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg dissented from 
the Commerce Clause ruling. The Ginsburg 
opinion was joined by Justices Sonia Sotomayor, 
Stephen Breyer, and Elena Kagan, together com-
prising the remaining four justices on the Court. 
They accepted the argument of the government 
that health insurance is simply a method of pay-
ing for health care, along with self-payment (or 
self-insurance) and reliance on charity.11 Virtu-
ally everyone in the country uses health care,12 
so they are necessarily health care consumers. 
More than 86% of national personal health care 
expenditures are paid through insurance.13 
Thus, Justice Ginsburg concluded, the mandate 
regulates people who are or will inevitably be 
active in the health care market and Congress 
can regulate the terms on which they pay for 
their care: “Persons subject to the mandate must 
now pay for medical care in advance (instead of 
at the point of service) and through insurance 
(instead of out of pocket).”1 The Ginsburg opin-
ion characterized the uninsured as getting a “free 
ride,”1 a term often used as a major justification 
for the individual mandate.14
Justice Ginsburg concluded that health care 
and its financing were unique and therefore 
found that Commerce Clause authority for the 
individual mandate would not result in an unre-
strained expansion of federal power. She specif-
ically rejected the conclusion that finding the 
individual mandate valid under the Commerce 
Clause would mean that the federal government 
could require people to purchase healthy vege-
tables, including broccoli, which she character-
ized as “the broccoli horrible.”1 She argued 
that broccoli purchases could be easily distin-
guished and that the claim that broccoli or vege-
table purchases would have a substantial effect 
on health care costs required a “chain of infer-
ences” that previous Commerce Clause cases had 
rejected.15
Federal Power to Tax
Chief Justice Roberts saved the individual man-
date by finding that the payment for noncompli-
ance is a tax, not a penalty, that Congress has 
authority to impose under the Taxing Power, an 
enumerated power distinct from the Commerce 
Clause.16 With the Ginsburg opinion, the chief 
justice had a five-to-four majority for this con-
clusion.
The ACA calls the payment a “penalty” for not 
having health insurance, but the Court is not 
bound by this label. The chief justice reasoned 
that the penalty functions like a tax. The ACA 
does not prescribe any punishment for failing to 
have coverage. Instead, the Internal Revenue Ser-
vice (IRS) collects the payment with federal in-
come taxes. The IRS is authorized to withhold 
the payment from any refund due the taxpayer, 
but it is barred from imposing criminal prose-
cution or additional penalties for nonpayment. 
Moreover, the payment amount is a small per-
centage of taxable income and is capped at a 
relatively low-level health insurance premium.17 
Thus, the failure to have coverage is not unlaw-
ful; it is simply taxable.
The joint dissent argued that the Court should 
take Congress at its word in calling the payment 
a “penalty,” asserting that upholding the man-
date as a tax amounted to rewriting, rather than 
interpreting, the statute.1
Indirect Federal Regulation through 
Conditional Federal Spending
The ACA amends the Medicaid statute by adding 
a new category of eligible recipients: persons 
younger than 65 years of age with incomes be-
low 133% of the federal poverty level ($14,170 for 
an individual and $23,050 for a family of four).18 
Existing categories were narrower and more spe-
cific, such as families with children, pregnant 
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women, and Supplemental Security Income recipi-
ents, with varied income ceilings for different 
groups. The federal government will pay 100% 
of the cost of the newly eligible beneficiaries 
through 2016 and 90% after 2020, instead of the 
50% to 83% that it now pays for currently eligi-
ble categories. One of the possible sanctions for 
a state that does not comply with the new Med-
icaid eligibility rules is forfeiture of federal fund-
ing for the entire Medicaid program in the state.
In the most unexpected result, seven justices 
concluded that the new category of eligibility 
for Medicaid in the ACA could not be imposed 
on the states as a condition of continuing to re-
ceive federal Medicaid funds for existing state 
Medicaid programs. The Spending Power of Con-
gress is an important source of power in areas 
in which the federal government does not have 
direct authority.16 For example, although Con-
gress has no constitutional authority to set a 
national minimum drinking age (or to require 
states to enact state laws), it has restricted eligi-
bility for full federal highway funding to states 
that have laws that set the minimum drinking 
age at 21 years.19 Because states are free to ac-
cept or reject federal funds and the conditions 
that come with them, the Court has never found 
that a condition on federal funding is an im-
pingement on state sovereignty.
The Court, nonetheless, agreed with the argu-
ment of the 26 states that challenged this provi-
sion of the ACA, that, in practice, the states have 
no choice but to accept the “new,” expanded eli-
gibility category and amend state Medicaid laws 
accordingly. The Court reasoned that if a state 
refused to accept this “new” Medicaid expansion, 
the federal government could “penalize” the 
state by terminating its participation in — and 
all federal funding for — the “old” Medicaid pro-
gram. The Court found that this “penalty” made 
the offer of new federal funding “coercive,” such 
that the federal government was “forcing” the 
states to accept it. In the opinion of the Court, 
federal coercion of states violated the core prin-
ciple of federalism.
The chief justice also emphasized that the 
Medicaid expansion was intended to complete 
the construction of an overarching federal pro-
gram: “It is no longer a program to care for the 
neediest among us, but rather an element of a 
comprehensive national plan to provide univer-
sal health insurance coverage.”1 Medicare covers 
persons 65 years of age or older, and the ACA 
will allow all those younger than 65 years of age 
to buy federally regulated health insurance through 
a federally regulated exchange, with federal sub-
sidies for those with incomes between 100% and 
400% of the federal poverty level. The Medicaid 
expansion, if adopted by all states, would bring 
almost everyone into a federally regulated system, 
something that both the chief justice and joint-
dissent justices appear to consider objectionable.
Federalism
The three opinions present strikingly different 
views of the authority of the federal government 
in relation to individuals and to the states. The 
chief justice and the joint dissent emphasized 
that the Constitution grants Congress only spe-
cifically enumerated powers, leaving all other 
sovereign powers to the states. They focused on 
how the Framers might have understood “com-
merce,” and the joint dissent quoted definitions 
from 18th-century dictionaries.1 The joint dissent 
argued that if Congress could regulate people 
who do nothing other than “breathe in and out,” 
then it becomes, in the words of Alexander 
Hamilton in The Federalist, No. 33, “the hideous 
monster whose devouring jaws . . . spare neither 
sex nor age, nor high nor low, nor sacred nor 
profane.”1 Their language suggests alarm at the 
prospect of an all-powerful national government 
— alarm that they believe the Framers shared.
In contrast, the Ginsburg opinion viewed the 
federal government as one designed to craft so-
lutions to national problems that the states can-
not solve by themselves. The joint dissent dis-
paraged this view as treating “the Constitution 
as though it is an enumeration of those problems 
that the Federal Government can address,”1 rath-
er than as a document that grants the federal 
government only specific, enumerated powers. 
The Ginsburg opinion replied that their views 
“bear a disquieting resemblance to those long-
overruled decisions” of the Court that struck 
down federal legislation from the early 20th 
century requiring minimum wages and maxi-
mum hours for employees.1,20 The different per-
spectives are reminiscent of disagreements over 
New Deal legislation. This seems to be why the 
Ginsburg opinion compared the ACA to the So-
cial Security Act, noting that although Social Se-
curity was unprecedented when first enacted, 
the Court found it to be a permissible exercise 
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of the power of Congress to tax and spend for 
the general welfare.21 They also expressed a dis-
agreement over the nature of health care, which 
Justice Ginsburg argued is unique and critical to 
life and which the majority of justices saw as 
just another market good.
Questions the Court Did Not Answer
By limiting the power of Congress to directly 
regulate individuals under the Commerce Clause, 
while allowing Congress to indirectly regulate 
individuals by taxation, the Court permits the 
federal government to influence individuals by 
taxing them for not having health insurance. 
This is now a constitutional way to regulate peo-
ple who are doing nothing. It is also precisely 
the type of expansion of federal power that the 
chief justice said would redefine the relationship 
of the federal government to individuals. Yet 
nothing in the opinions appears to limit the use 
of this power. Given the number of things that 
“people do not do,” the taxing power is now re-
markably broad. The chief justice even suggested 
that a $50 tax on homeowners without energy-
efficient windows would be a permissible tax.1 
He did not address whether a $15,000 tax on the 
uninsured would be permissible or would be an 
unjustified penalty. Future questions may include 
whether a federal tax on failing to use public 
transportation or failing to maintain a normal 
body-mass index would be constitutional. As for 
the “broccoli horrible” hypothetical, this opin-
ion arguably supports congressional power to 
tax people for not buying broccoli.
The most unsettling aspect of the Court deci-
sion is the novel limit on the authority of the 
federal government to impose conditions on how 
its money is used. The Court had never before 
found a federal spending program to be coer-
cive, and most scholars believed coercion to be 
an illusory standard that the Court would not 
apply. It is remarkable that the Court could con-
clude that states have no choice but to accept 
the new Medicaid conditions with their Medicaid 
funding. Although federal funding provides an 
incentive for states to participate in a federal 
program, it is hardly a “gun to the head,” as the 
chief justice called it.1 The ACA made the new 
Medicaid funding generous in order to entice the 
states to participate, and Congress expected all 
states to do so. However, that expectation was 
based on the fact that the offer was so generous 
that no rational decision maker would refuse it, 
not because it was coercive.
Because the coercion rationale seems so weak, 
it is perhaps not surprising that the opinions fail 
to explain what counts as coercion. The leading 
case on the Spending Power, South Dakota v. Dole, 
held that it was not coercive for the federal gov-
ernment to withhold 5% of federal highway funds 
from states that failed to enact a state law raising 
the minimum age for drinking alcohol to 21 
years.19 In the ACA case, the Court found that it 
was coercive to withhold 100% of federal Med-
icaid funds. However, the Court did not attempt 
to draw any principled line between coercive and 
noncoercive payments, so it is unclear whether 
withholding anything between 5% and 100% of 
funding could qualify as unconstitutionally forc-
ing states to accept a federal program.
Moreover, although the Court found that it is 
coercive to make the funding of an old program 
conditional on the adoption of a new program, 
it did not provide a meaningful standard for de-
termining when a statutory amendment might 
be considered a “new” federal funding program, 
rather than an “amendment” of a previous pro-
gram. The chief justice said that “a shift in kind, 
not merely degree” creates a new program.1 The 
expansion of Medicaid in the ACA altered both 
the categories of individuals and the income level 
that qualified for eligibility. Is a change in both 
required to constitute a new program, or does 
only one suffice? Federal programs, including 
Medicaid, are often altered as experience sug-
gests needed improvements.22 At this point, no 
one can confidently predict how to distinguish a 
new program from an amendment. Because so 
many federally funded health, education, and 
housing programs depend on the use of the con-
ditional spending power, this ruling may encour-
age opponents of these programs to challenge 
new conditions in court.
Implications
Remarkably, given all the commentary about the 
importance of this case to the future authority of 
the federal government, none of the opinions 
made any attempt to limit the currently broad 
power to regulate interstate commerce that the 
federal government currently possesses. Rather, 
the Court seems to have expanded federal power 
to tax people for “doing nothing,” the primary 
fear that brought this case to court. It is hard to 
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believe that this power is as expansive as the 
chief justice suggested, but his opinion did not 
discuss limitations. The current taxing power 
certainly would permit an increased income or 
payroll tax to expand Medicare or create a new 
federal substitute for Medicaid. However, the 
limits of the taxing power probably will not be 
tested soon. It is the power that Congress is least 
likely to exercise in an era of widespread antipathy 
to tax increases.
The lack of health care for the poor is a na-
tional problem that the federal government was 
trying to fix and one that only the federal gov-
ernment can fix. States cannot solve national 
problems. With health insurance exchanges open 
to all legal residents and Medicare providing 
coverage for elderly adults, the addition of all 
low-income, nonelderly adults to Medicaid by the 
ACA would give virtually the entire population 
access to affordable health insurance. The deci-
sion of the Court to allow the states to reject the 
Medicaid expansion, however, creates a substan-
tial gap in the comprehensive-coverage design 
of the ACA. States such as Florida and Texas, 
whose governors have already pledged to reject 
the Medicaid expansion, have large uninsured 
populations.23 Such states may leave their unin-
sured populations doubly burdened. They will 
deny impoverished citizens the coverage that the 
federal government was willing to finance and 
also leave many (who are above the tax-filing 
threshold) subject to the new tax on the unin-
sured. The ACA does not provide tax subsidies to 
those below 100% of the poverty level, because 
they were expected to be covered by Medicaid. 
Their impoverished legal residents must continue 
to rely on the charity of safety-net providers, 
which is the very problem that the ACA was de-
signed to solve.
The broad significance of this case can be 
found in the justices’ views of the proper roles 
of the state and federal governments and not 
just in what they ruled about the ACA itself. The 
immediate effect is to return the constitutionally 
blessed ACA to the political realm. It is now up 
to Congress, the individual states, and espe-
cially the next president to determine the fate of 
the ACA. Because the case was decided by the 
vote of a single justice, however, the future of 
federal involvement in health care may also de-
pend on the views of the next justice appointed 
to the Court.
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